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FIRST AMENDMENT ENTITLEMENTS
AND GOVERNMENT MOTIVES:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MERRILL
DavidA. Strauss*
Professor Merrill makes a powerful argument for allowing tobacco advertising to be restricted or prohibited.! He convincingly demonstrates that,
on the most plausible assumptions, tobacco advertising inflicts substantial
costs and does not confer benefits of a sufficient magnitude to offset those
costs. To a large extent, this argument stands on its own and does not depend
on the interesting framework that Merrill develops in the rest of his article
and that I will discuss here. A severe disparity between costs and benefits has
to give anyone pause; one need not be committed to an explicit cost-benefit
approach in order to agree that we should hesitate to recognize a constitutional right to do something that inflicts such large net burdens on society.
Many people believe, for example, that an approach focusing on
monetizable costs and benefits does not fully capture the ways in which
freedom of expression protects the autonomy of speakers or of potential
consumers of speech.2 To be sure, such autonomy-based approaches might
not be very useful when applied to tobacco advertising. It seems unlikely
that advertisers have a significant autonomy interest in speaking; and as
Professor Merrill suggests, the autonomy interests of teenagers-the primary targets of tobacco advertising-might well be best protected by restricting advertising. But even assuming that important autonomy interests
are significantly affected by a restriction on tobacco advertising, why
net harm inflicted by tobacco
shouldn't those interests be overridden if the
3
advertising is as great as Merrill suggests?
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This is an expanded and muchrevised version of my oral comments on Thomas Merrill's paper. I am grateful to Professor Merrill and
to the other participants and audience members at Free Speech and Economic Power: A Symposium for
their comments. The Lee and Brena Freeman Faculty Fund and the Sonnenschein Fund at the University of Chicago Law School provided financial support for this project.
I Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting,Purchasing,and Possibly
Condemning Tobacco Advertising,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1143 (1999).
2 On speaker autonomy, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). On listener
autonomy, see Thomas Scanlon, A Theory ofFreedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); David
A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, andFreedomof Expression,91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
3 See Strauss, supranote 2, at 360-61.
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At the same time, the kind of cost-benefit analysis that Professor Merrill
uses does have a number of important virtues. Following others who have
used a similar approach, Merrill suggests a plausible way of differentiating
commercial speech from other kinds of speech. This distinction is notoriously hard to make in abstract terms, although few would deny that there is
some "common sense" basis for it.4 Merrill's suggestion is that commercial
speech is different because-unlike, for example, speech on political matters,
or artistic expression-commercial speech is unlikely to have significant external benefits.5 This is not a flawless way of drawing the line between
commercial and noncommercial expression, but it seems to be at least as
good a basis for a distinction as anyone has come up with so far.
Perhaps the most intriguing idea in Professor Merrill's essay, however,
is his suggestion that the framework developed by Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed might be applied to constitutional rights6 -and particularly
his novel and very interesting proposal that the right to engage in commercial
advertising might, in certain cases, properly be condemned by the government and taken in exchange for just compensation. This condemnation proposal emphasizes the point that commercial speech more closely resembles
economic activity of the kind the government is traditionally allowed to
regulate, rather than speech that is generally immune from regulation.7
The use of the Calabresi and Melamed approach to free speech, like
Professor Merrill's specific argument about tobacco advertising, can be useful even if one is not inclined to adopt an explicit cost-benefit framework.
The Calabresi and Melamed categories might be used by someone who
thinks that freedom of expression primarily protects autonomy interests, or
even by someone who believes that the primary purpose of free speech is to
ensure the proper functioning of democratic government."
For example, to the extent that speaker autonomy is thought to be the
basis for freedom of expression, the idea that the right to speak should be
protected by a property rule-freely alienable, but only at the option of the
speaker-is likely to be appealing. If the speaker's autonomy is the core
interest being protected, then the speaker's willingness to give up the right
to speak should ordinarily be decisive. By contrast, if the listeners' auton4 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976) (referring to "commonsense differences between" commercial and noncommercial
speech).
5 See Merrill, supranote 1, at 1182-84; see also Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance:
Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Free
Speech in an Economic Perspective,20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
6 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
7 See Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., CommercialSpeech: Economic Due Process
and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
8 See, eg., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE (1960); CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
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omy is more important, then an inalienability rule becomes more attractive:
the speaker's willingness to give up the right does not justify infringing the
listeners' autonomy. If the most important purpose of free expression is to
ensure that the government remains responsive to the people, then there is
good reason to be suspicious of the liability approach that Professor Merrill
identifies: it is risky to allow the government to silence its critics simply by
paying a judicially-determined price.
Still, the Calabresi and Melamed framework was originally designed
for common law entitlements, and Professor Merrill's fruitful idea of applying it to constitutional rights raises certain difficult issues. Those issues
arise principally from the fact that, so far as we are concerned with them
here, constitutional rights are rights against the government. As Merrill of
course recognizes, the government is in many ways not like a private actor.
But perhaps the government is so much unlike a private actor that the
framework Merrill proposes does not, in the end, keep us from having to
deal with the questions confronted in traditional First Amendment analysis,
questions that Merrill's approach is intended in part to avoid-notably
questions about government motivation.9
The root of the problem is that the government is not just a participant
in market transactions. It is also a regulator. This means at least two
things. First, the private actors to whom the Calabresi and Melamed model
has traditionally been applied are assumed to have certain interests, which
they pursue-and legitimately so. By contrast, when the government regulates, it has, in a sense, no legitimate self-interest. The government is supposed to act in society's interest. If it pursues the interests of particular
government officials, or of interest groups whose interests deviate from society's as a whole, then it is not acting as it should.
As a result, anyone trying to determine what the government's prerogatives should be must confront the question whether, in any particular
kind of case, the government is likely to be acting in society's interest. This
is a traditional concern of First Amendment analysis. The Calabresi and
Melamed model, when applied to private conduct, requires no comparable
inquiry. Professor Merrill's effort to use that model to avoid the messy
speculativeness of traditional First Amendment approaches is admirable;
but it is unclear that it can succeed.
Second, because the government is a regulator, it determines the rights
of others. Professor Merrill, following the Calabresi and Melamed frame9 Although courts, in applying the First Amendment, do not always explicitly inquire into the mo-

tives of the government actor who has restricted speech, much of First Amendment doctrine seems
pretty clearly to reflect a concern with the motivation of the government. This is true, for example, of
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulation that is so prominent in First
Amendment doctrine, and of the courts' general willingness to accept incidental restrictions on speech.
For an extended argument to this effect-that an implicit concern with government motive is at the core
of much of First Amendment doctrine-see Elena Kagan, PrivateSpeech, PublicPurpose: The Role of
GovernmentalMotive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996).
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work, supposes that the government is faced with essentially a binary choice:

either it allows an individual to exercise a right, or it uses its own resources
(if necessary) to try to prevent the exercise of the right. Again, though, in a
sense the government does not have, or does not need to use, "its own" resources. As a regulator, the government is engaged in deciding who should
bear the various costs of an individual's exercise of a right. A danger of
Merrill's approach, therefore, is that it diverts attention from important questions about the extent to which individuals have to pay for the cost of exercising their constitutional rights. The point might be summarized by saying
that "Rule Four" cases, regarded by Merrill as rare or nonexistent, are in a
sense the norm. This point is also perhaps of the most direct relevance to the
subject of this symposium, free speech and economic power.
I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MOTIVATION

Professor Merrill summarizes his theory as follows:
[T]he transactional rule applied to any particular constitutional right
will depend primarily on whether the exercise of that right generates signifi-

cant net external benefits or significant net external costs. Constitutional
rights that generate significant net external benefits above and beyond the
value of the private right will be protected with inalienability rules ....

At

the other extreme, constitutional rights that generate net external costs that exceed the private value of the right are subject to being trumped by the police
power ....

The intermediate case between these two poles is where a constitu-

tional right has no significant net external benefits or costs, either because
there are no appreciable external effects or because the external benefits and
external costs more or less cancel out. In these situations, we typically allow
the individual rights holder to determine whether to invoke the right, or

whether to waive
the right in exchange for government benefits that have a
10
higher value.
Professor Merrill's principal example of the kind of First Amendment
right that should be protected by an inalienability rule is the right of public
employees to speak on subjects of public interest. Merrill certainly seems
on solid ground in suggesting that such speech can have substantial external
benefits-external in the sense that the speakers themselves will not be
compensated for conferring them. Therefore, a speaker might choose to
remain silent in exchange for a higher effective wage from the government,
even in circumstances in which society would benefit more from having the
speech uttered.
Two problems immediately arise, however. First, while the Constitution limits the government's ability to require its employees to give up their
First Amendment rights, it imposes no limits whatever on private employ10Merrill, supranote 1, at 1154-55.

1208
HeinOnline -- 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1208 1998-1999

93:1205 (1999)

FirstAmendment Entitlements and Government Motives

ees. Perhaps the speech of government employees will, all else being equal,
tend to have more beneficial externalities than the speech of private employees. But it seems doubtful that the tendency is so pronounced that it
justifies such a radical difference in the treatment of the two kinds of cases.
If Professor Merrill's theory were the basis for the constitutional protection
of government employees' speech, one would expect to see private employees' speech protected by the Constitution as well, and it indisputably is not.
This suggests that the real concern about the government limiting its employees' speech might have to do not with the net balance of external benefits but with something about the government in particular-such as
suspicion about the government's motivations.
Second, and more fundamental, it is unclear whether the assumptions
Professor Merrill uses about the government's behavior at this point in his
paper are consistent with the rest of his analysis. In his discussion of property and (potentially) liability rules for First Amendment rights, Merrill assumes that the government will act in a way that reflects the aggregate
interests of the population:
Under a liability rule, the government must compensate the rightsholder for the
private value of the exercise of the constitutional right. Insofar as the govemment seeks to obtain the maximum benefit from its expenditure of public funds,
the government will condemn and compensate only if the social benefits of extinguishing the right exceed the private value of the right. Thus, the government
do so.
will condemn and compensate only when it is socially efficient to
The assumption here is that the government will act in a way that maximizes net social benefits. Of course, Professor Merrill is aware that this is a
questionable assumption. According to well-known theories, governments
respond to interest group pressure in ways that produce systematic deviations from socially efficient outcomes."2 In addition, governments can be
subject to agency problems; that is, government officials may act out of
their own self-interest rather than the government's (or society's) interest.
The Calabresi and Melamed framework, however, does not address
complexities like these when it discusses the motivations of the actors involved in exchanges of entitlements; it simply assumes that they will act in
a fashion that rationally promotes their self-interest (or, if they do not, that
paternalistic action by the government is appropriate). Professor Merrill
has to make some assumption about government behavior, and there is no
good comprehensive account of government behavior that he can draw on.
In these circumstances, it is certainly reasonable for Merrill to adopt the assumption that underlies much of constitutional law, and indeed much of
n Id. at 1201.
12

The locus classicus of this theory is MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1965).
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democratic theory: that the decisions governments make reflect the overall
interests of society.
The problem is that if we accept this assumption, then it is not clear
how to support the conclusion Professor Merrill reached earlier, that constitutional rights should sometimes be inalienable. If the government's decisions reflect the overall good of society, the government will, by
hypothesis, not ask an employee, or anyone else, to alienate a constitutional
right unless it is socially beneficial for the employee to do so. Or, to put the
point the other way, if (as Merrill realistically assumes) it is possible for the
government to act in a way that is contrary to society's interests when it
asks an employee to alienate the right to speak, then it is similarly possible
for the government to act contrary to society's interests when it purchases
(or condemns) tobacco companies' right to speak.
I share Professor Merrill's views both about government employees'
speech-that in general the Constitution should fairly strictly limit the government's power over its employees' speech-and about potential restrictions on tobacco advertising, which I think generally do not violate the
Constitution. But I share those views because I think the government is
more likely to be acting for bad motives in the first case than in the second.
The Calabresi and Melamed framework, which assumes rational, selfinterested action by private actors, cannot straightforwardly accommodate
such an assessment of government motives. By contrast, traditional First
Amendment analysis is deeply concerned with assessing the circumstances
in which government officials are likely to act for good or bad reasons.
Differentiating among property rights, liability rules, and inalienability restraints can be a very helpful way to analyze First Amendment rights. But
it will not avoid engaging the traditional First Amendment concern with
government motivation.
II. THE UBIQUITY OF RULE FOUR CASES
"Rule Four cases" in the Calabresi and Melamed framework, as Professor Merrill calls them, are, roughly speaking, those in which a party has a
right to engage in certain conduct but must pay the cost of doing so. Merrill
deliberately omits Rule Four cases from his account on the ground that such
cases--"situation[s] in which an individual can acquire a constitutional right
against the government, but only by paying the government for
1 3 the costs asnonexistent.
perhaps
or
"rare"
exercise"-are
its
with
sociated
Professor Merrill seems right in saying that it is rare for courts explicitly to describe constitutional rights in this way. But in fact the question
whether a constitutional right should be a Rule Four right or some other
kind of entitlement is often present-perhaps, at a deep level, always present-and omitting it from the picture obscures important issues. The fault,
13

Merrill, supra note 1, at 1153.
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however, does not lie with Merrill's particular, and understandable, lack of
interest in Rule Four. Rather, it stems again from the fact that constitutional
rights-rights against the government-are different from the kinds of
rights to which the Calabresi and Melamed framework has usually been applied, and those differences greatly complicate the task of applying that
framework in the constitutional context.
The celebrated case of Gideon v. Wainwright 14 illustrates this point.
Gideon held that a defendant in a felony prosecution has the right to appointed counsel. Even before Gideon, there was no question that a criminal
defendant had the right to the assistance of counsel that the defendant himself paid for. What Gideon held was that the defendant had a right to insist
that the state pay for the lawyer. How would one describe the holding of
Gideon in Calabresi and Melamed terms? One might say that, after Gideon,
the right to counsel is a property right. (It is not inalienable, because a defendant can give it up by a knowing and voluntary waiver.) But then, what
kind of entitlement was the right to counsel before Gideon? In the Calabresi
and Melamed framework, the best way to describe it seems to be as a Rule
Four entitlement. The defendant was allowed to have a lawyer, but he had to
pay for it. Gideon turned that Rule Four entitlement into a property right.
Of course the pre-Gideon defendant did not have to pay the government; he paid the private lawyer. But why does it matter whether the holder
of the entitlement has to pay the government or a private party? That did
not make any difference to pre-Gideon criminal defendants. They still had
to pay if they wanted to exercise the right. More to the point, if one does
not describe Gideon as changing the entitlement from Rule Four entitlement
to a property right, how does one describe what Gideon did, within the
Calabresi and Melamed framework? Surely Gideon did something.
Once one goes this far, however, Rule Four entitlements are everywhere in constitutional law. If you want to exercise your First Amendment
right to run a TV advertisement critical of the President, you have to pay for
the broadcast air time. The government does not have to furnish you free
air time, even if you can't afford it, in the way it has to furnish you a free
criminal lawyer. There is a constitutional right to freedom of religion, to
political association, to petition the government, and to have an abortion.
But the government does not have to pay for the upkeep on your house of
worship (in fact, it may be prohibited from doing so) or your political party
clubhouse; it does not have to pay for solicitors to seek signatures on the
petitions that the First Amendment gives you a right to present; it does not
have to pay for an abortion. (This is a noncontroversial point; the controversy is whether the government must pay for an abortion if it is funding
other, comparable medical procedures.)15 All of these constitutional rights
are in a sense Rule Four entitlements.
14 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15 See, eg., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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The taxonomic question whether these are "Rule Four" cases hardly
matters in itself. What matters is the possibility that the Calabresi and
Melamed framework is simply not refined enough to be helpful in the
analysis of these issues. The exercise of First Amendment rights (and many
other constitutional rights) is costly. But there are many different kinds of
costs. The constitutional rule is that the government is allowed to insist that
the speaker bear certain kinds of costs, but the government must allocate
some of the costs to someone other than the speaker. The definition of constitutional rights is often a matter of defining and limiting the power of the
government to impose certain costs that are associated with the exercise of
the right on the individual who holds the right.
The government may, for example, require that a speaker pay for her
own air time and direct mail operation. But if the speech imposes psychic
costs on listeners whom it offends-as constitutionally protected speech
sometimes will-the government may not require the speaker to bear those
costs. Those costs will fall on the victims, unless the government compensates the victims from tax revenues. Similarly, if criticism of a government
policy makes the policy less effective (by prolonging an unpopular war, for
example), the government ordinarily may not make the speaker bear those
costs. The landmark First Amendment decision in New York Times v. Sullivan16 amounted to a holding that a speaker may not be required to bear the
costs that a false and damaging utterance imposes on the reputation of a
public official, so long as the falsehood was negligent or innocent.
One upshot is that Professor Merrill's analysis of tobacco advertising
could be expanded to include the Rule Four category. Even if the government may not forbid, buy out, or condemn tobacco advertising, perhaps it
should be allowed to require tobacco advertisers to pay for the harm that
their advertising inflicts. This would be a parallel to the highly publicized
measures enacted by some jurisdictions (but subsequently declared unconof pornography liable to alleged victims in
stitutional) that made purveyors
17
a civil damages action.
The deeper question, however, is whether the Calabresi and Melamed
framework must be supplemented by some account of governmental motivation if it is to be an adequate approach to First Amendment rights. Why
is the government allowed to impose some costs on speakers but not others?
The net external costs or benefits of the speech cannot be the explanation.
The fact that speech has certain external benefits may explain why it is subsidized, and may justify a subsidy of a certain amount; but it cannot explain
why certain kinds of costs are systematically imposed on the speaker, while
certain other kinds may not be. The explanation for that has to lie, again,
with some assessment of the government's motives.
16376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17 See, e.g., Amercian Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
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The point may be put concretely. Why can the government insist that
speakers bear the costs of broadcast air time, but not the cost of the psychic
injury they inflict or the harm they cause to the government's efforts to implement its policies? The answer must be that an across-the-board rule that
everyone pay for broadcast air time does not give rise to a substantial concern about the government's regulatory motives. But a regime in which the
government assessed costs for psychic injury or injury to the government's
policy implementation would invite abuse. Here again, the underlying
problem is that the government is acting as a regulator, and its regulatory
actions must be evaluated. The fact that the government has taken a certain
action cannot immediately be viewed as proof that the action is socially
beneficial.
The Calabresi and Melamed framework that Professor Merrill skillfully develops in his article can indeed shed valuable light on First
Amendment issues. But there are many differences between the allocation
of entitlements among private entities and the definition of rights against
the government-too many to allow that framework to supersede the traditional central concerns of First Amendment analysis. Those concerns are
analytically unsatisfactory in many ways. Often they amount to relatively
crude generalizations about government behavior supported by, at most,
only the most rough and ready kind of empirical evidence, if that. But that
kind of analysis, as unsatisfactory as it is, may be unavoidable for now.
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